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Title: Sequence effects in time trade-off valuation of hypothetical health states  
 
Abstract 
Choice-based stated preference methods, such as Time Trade-Offs (TTOs), are used to 
establish health state utilities informing healthcare allocation. However, little is 
known about the presence of (position-dependent and precedent-dependent) sequence 
effects in the valuation of health states, despite techniques requiring respondents to 
evaluate several health states in a sequence. This paper is the first to explicitly test for 
the presence of sequence effects in the health domain using a new explanation based on 
contrast effects and preference imprecision. The implication being that randomisation 
cannot avoid sequence effects.  
 
Six TTO questions were designed using the EQ-5D-3L descriptive system. These 
were grouped into two blocks of three and within each block four sequences were used. 
In an online survey, 1,197 Spanish respondents answered one grouping of three TTO 
questions. Results indicate that sequence effects can affect preferences as utilities of 
health states are biased downwards if preceded by a better health state and biased 
upwards if preceded by a worse health state.  
 
This study informs our understanding of how context effects interact with preference 









Most surveys conducted to calculate health state utilities ask subjects to evaluate several 
health states. For example, in EuroQol (Dolan et al., 1995; Dolan et al., 1996) subjects are 
asked to evaluate several health states, in a sequence, using the Time Trade-off (TTO) 
technique. However, in the valuation of health states very little is known about the 
presence of sequence effects. In principle, we would expect that calculating utilities of 
health state A and then of health state B would be the same (except for random error) as 
starting with B and then asking for A.  Within stated preference tasks there is increasing 
evidence of the pervasiveness of sequence effects (Augestad et al., 2012; Day & Pinto 
Prades, 2010; DeShazo, 2002; McNair et al., 2011); yet in the health domain this issue is 
underexplored. One of the few papers to analyse this issue is Augestad et al. (2012) who 
find that mild health states have higher utilities if evaluated later in a sequence while the 
utilities of severe health states decrease. However, as  Augestad et al. (2012)  was not 
designed to study sequence effects it is difficult to know the reasons for their 
occurrence; although based on their results ex-post explanations can be offered. The aim 
of this paper is to explicitly test for the presence of sequence effects using a design based 
on a novel explanation of those effects.  
 
Underpinning our explanation of sequence effects is the role of contrast effects. This is a 
psychological phenomenon that has been observed in multiple situations, beginning in  
psychophysics (Fernberger, 1920). More recently, it has been observed that contrast 
effects can affect judgements about social issues, for example,  about self and others 
(Biernat et al., 1997), evaluation of physical attractiveness (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980), 
food quality (Lahne & Zellner, 2015), happiness (Damisch et al., 2006) and economic 
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decisions (Simonsohn, 2006; Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 2006). While Fernberger 
(1920) noted a century ago that contrast effects could produce sequence effects1, we add 
another element, namely, preference imprecision. We suggest that the intrinsic difficulty 
that people have in evaluating health states using methods, such as the Time Trade-Off 
(TTO) or the Standard Gamble (SG) can also contribute to the presence of sequence 
effects. Our proposal is that sequence effects can be explained by a combination of these 
two effects – contrast effects and preference imprecision. This theory is presented in 
Section 2. Based on this explanation/theory of sequence effects we designed a survey 
(Section 3) aimed at testing the predictions of the theory. We are not aware of any other 
study in the health literature explicitly designed to test for the existence of sequence 
effects.  While “the typical way of neutralizing question order bias in the aggregate is to 
randomise the order in which different health states are valued” (Ternent & Tsuchiya, 
2013, p545), if our explanation of sequence effects is correct, randomisation will not 
avoid those effects. Our results (Section 4) support this, as we present strong evidence 
of sequence effects which are not avoided through randomisation. Finally, we suggest in 
the Discussion (Section 5) that our results are not only relevant for the specific issue of 
sequences but have wider implications for the way that preferences are modelled in 
health economics.   
 
In summary, our paper makes two main contributions:  
 
 Theoretical contribution: the paper presents a new explanation of sequence 
effects in the health domain based on contrast effects and preference 
imprecision. 
                                                        
1 “if a comparison stimulus, (……) immediately follows the lightest pair, for which, of course, the judgment 
is usually 'lighter,' there is a strong tendency that it will be judged 'heavier.' “(Fernberger, 1920, p.149). 
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 Empirical contribution: the survey is designed to test new hypotheses about 
sequence effects.  
2. Theory 
2.1 Defining sequence effects 
 
Sequence effects can broadly occur in two different ways – position-dependent order 
effects and precedent-dependent order effects (Day et al., 2012). The former 
corresponds to the position of the objects in the sequence and the latter to the nature of 
the options in preceding tasks. For example, in the sequences ‘A-B-C’ and ‘C-B-A’ the 
position of B does not change but the preceding object evaluated changes. If object B is 
evaluated differently in both sequences this can be attributed to precedent-dependent 
order effects but not to position-dependent order effects. We next present a simple 
decision model that can help us to understand sequence effects.  
2.2 Contrast effects and preference imprecision 
 
Our explanation of sequence effects is based on the idea that responding to preference 
elicitation questions for health states is a complex task. In general, it is difficult for 
people to respond to preference elicitation questions when they are unfamiliar with the 
good, the task or both (Hausman, 2012; McFadden & Train, 2017); people are uncertain 
about their preferences. The evaluation of health states seems to be one of those 
situations. For example, when researchers conduct test-retest exercises of tasks, such as 
TTO, SG or Choice Experiments they usually find some element of variability in the 
responses (Feeny et al., 2004; Gamper et al., 2018; van Agt et al., 1994). In a recent 
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study, Gamper et al (2018) found that only 25% of subjects were perfectly consistent 
(i.e. repeated exactly the same choice between two options) in a choice experiment.  
 
The complexity of the task has two implications for subjects’ responses to TTO 
questions. One is that they can be subject to context effects. Simonson and Tversky 
(1992, p292) argue that “when people are uncertain about the values of options, they 
are more likely to use the context in determining the ‘best buy’” and Tversky and 
Simonson (1993, p1184) state that context effects “are expected to vanish in situations 
where people have well-articulated preferences, and they are expected to be positive 
when the choice is more difficult and less certain”.  When it is difficult for people to 
know the precise value of an object, they tend to use relative comparisons to evaluate 
them. This can produce contrast effects.  We can define a contrast effect as a negative 
(positive) change in the perception of an object prompted by recent exposure to a more 
positive (more negative) object. If the objects are health states and a subject considers 
that health state A is better than B, contrast implies that the perception of A will be 
better if B is evaluated first followed by A than if A is evaluated in the first place. The 
second implication is that there will be an element of variability in the evaluation of 
health states. Some people may change their responses to the same question from one 
moment to the next (Feeny et al., 2004; Gamper et al., 2018; van Agt et al., 1994). This 
leads to the next decision model. 
2.3 Preferences, imprecision and contrast 
Following Tversky and Simonson (1993) we assume that preferences can be 
represented as shown in equation 1: 
 UB(x) = u(x) +  fB(x) + x
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UB(x) is a context-dependent utility function where x denotes the object to be valued and 
the subscript indicates that the utility depends on the “background” context, namely, the 
effect of previous choices on the valuation of x. The utility of the object is a linear 
function of three elements, namely, u(x) is the context-free value of x, fB (x) is the effect 
of the background (i.e. contrast effects) and X is a random element. In our model X 
reflects within-subject variability. We can assume for the sake of simplicity, that X is a 
normally distributed random variable with zero mean.
 
We also hypothesize another characteristic of individuals’ preferences will influence the 
evaluation of objects in a sequence, namely, people will try to be internally consistent 
when they evaluate several health states in a sequence. For example, they will try to 
avoid violating transparent dominance. This assumption is similar to the Coherent 
Arbitrariness effect observed by Ariely et al (2003). This characteristic of preferences 
will contribute to the generation of sequence effects, as we explain next.  
2.4 Explaining sequence effects 
We propose that preferences for health state S can be represented by a set (LS) of 
potential utilities (𝑈1
𝑆, 𝑈2
𝑆, … . , 𝑈𝑛
𝑆) and it is as if the subject responds to a TTO question 
by choosing one of those utilities. If S is evaluated in the first position of the sequence, 
the response to the TTO will be influenced by the context-free utility of S and the 
random component X. If S is not the first health state in a sequence, the response to the 
TTO question will also be influenced by contrast, that is to say, by the severity of health 




We can also assume that if two health states (A and B) are similar in terms of severity, 
the intrinsic utility will not be very different, contrast effects will not be very large and  
will be small. However, there will be a lot of overlap between LA and LB produced by  
and . The opposite will happen if A and B are very different. If one is very mild and the 
other is very severe, contrast effects can be very large but there will be almost no 
overlap between LA and LB produced by  and .  
 
2.4.1 A sequence of two health states 
Our model makes clear predictions regarding the direction of sequence effects. We start 
with the simplest case, namely, a sequence of two health states, X and Y. Assuming that X 
is perceived as better than Y (X≻Y) by the subject, U(Y) will be lower in the sequence X-
Y than U(Y) in the sequence Y-X. The opposite will happen for X. In general, when a 
health state is evaluated in the second position of the sequence and it is preceded by a 
better (worse) health state, the utility will be lower (higher) than if it is evaluated first in 
the sequence.  Those predictions are an immediate consequence of contrast effects, since 
Y will be perceived as more severe in the sequence X-Y than in sequence Y-X if X≻Y.   
We also want to point out that uncertainty (the X) may also play a role, even if E(X)=0, 
especially when the context-free U(X) and U(Y) are similar. In that case, there will be a 
lot of overlap between LX and LY produced by  and .  In the sequence X-Y, the 
potential values of LY that the subject can use in her response, will be constrained by the 
value U(X) chosen from LX since the subject wants to avoid violating dominance. For 
example, assume LX is (0.50, 0.51…0.6) and LY is (0.45, 0.46…0.55). Assume that in the 
sequence X-Y, the subject responds U(X)=0.52. Since we assume that the subject wants 
to respect dominance, LY will be constrained to (0.45, 0.46…0.51) which will lead to U(Y) 
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being lower in the sequence X-Y than in the sequence Y-X. In the case of X, the prediction 
is the opposite. While both effects (uncertainty and contrast) work in the same direction 
to produce sequence effects, it seems logical to assume that contrast effects will be 
stronger when the two health states are very different since there will be a lot of 
contrast between the two. The role of uncertainty and internal consistency will be larger 
when the context-free utility of the health states are very close since, in that case, there 
will be a lot of overlap between LX and LY.  In summary, sequence effects could be the 
consequence of two effects. One, produced by contrast results in changes in perceptions 
and hence preferences, reflected through different valuations. The other, produced by 
imprecision affects valuations but not preferences due to a desire to be consistent in a 
limited valuation space. 
 
2.4.2 A sequence of three health states 
Assume now that we have three health states (the case we use in our study) that can be 
ranked by the subject from best to worst. Let us call ‘B’ the Best health state, ‘W’ the 
Worst and ‘I’ the Middle one. Predictions with three health states are more complicated 
since it is not clear how much “memory” a subject has. By “memory” we mean if the 
subject remembers or not, the response to the first question when responding to the 
third question or if it is only the previous response that influences her response to the 
third question. However, even if we do not know how much “memory” people have we 
can make some predictions. To explain that further, we will introduce what we call 
“Ascending”, “Descending” or “Mixed” sequences. An Ascending sequence is a sequence 
where each health state is better than the previous one. In the case of our three health 
states, it would be W-I-B. The Descending sequence would be B-I-W and the rest would 
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be considered Mixed2  sequences. Based on our previous model, predictions for 
Ascending or Descending sequences are clear but for Mixed sequences this is less so.  
 
In the case of Ascending or Descending sequences, the effect goes in the same direction 
as if there were only two health states, but it is stronger.  Assume we have Ascending 
sequence W-I-B. Our model predicts that U(B) in sequence W-I-B will be higher than in 
sequence I-B. The clearest reason is based on the consistency argument. This argument 
implies that LI will already be constrained by the response to W, pushing U(I) upwards. 
This will further constrain the set of responses for B in LB that the subject can use in 
order to maintain consistency. In relation to contrast effects, this will lead to a higher 
U(B) in sequence W-I-B if people compare B to the previous health state (I) after 
considering the initial health state (W). In the case of Descending sequences, B-I-W, the 
same arguments will lead to U(W) being lower than in the sequence I-W. 
 
In summary, we have the following hypotheses when three health states are evaluated 
in a sequence (see columns 7 and 8 in Table 1): 
H1: The best health state will receive higher values when evaluated in second or 
third position than when evaluated in the first position. 
H2: The worst health state will receive lower values when evaluated in second or 
third position than when evaluated in the first position. 
H3: The intermediate health state will receive lower values when evaluated after the 
best health state than when evaluated in the first position of the sequence. 
                                                        
2 Mixed sequences are further subdivided into Mixed_1 and Mixed_2. These categories relate to the 
position of the best health state (second position in Mixed_1 and third position in Mixed_2). 
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H4: The intermediate health state will receive higher values when evaluated after the 
worst health state than when evaluated in the first position of the sequence. 
H5: The utility of the best health state will be higher when evaluated in the third 
position of the sequence than when in the second position of the sequence, when the 
previous health state is the same in both cases. 
H6: The utility of the worst health state will be lower when evaluated in the third 
position of the sequence than when in the second position of the sequence, when the 
previous health state is the same in both cases. 
 
In the case of Mixed sequences, it is less clear the kind of prediction we can make for 
the health state evaluated in the third position. For this reason, we will abstain from 
making predictions for those cases.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Survey Design 
 
TTO questions were designed using the EQ-5D-3L descriptive system3 (Dolan et al., 
1996). This instrument consists of five domains – mobility, self-care, usual activities, 
pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression – which have three possible levels – no 
problems (level 1), some problems (level 2) and extreme problems (level 3). Thus a 
health state 11111 refers to full health and 33333 refers to the worst health. This means 
the EQ-5D-3L defines 243 theoretically possible health states. Six different health states 
                                                        
3 A five level EQ-5D descriptive system has now been developed (EQ-5D-5L) (Herdman et al., 2011).  
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were used from this instrument (see Table 1). 
 
Health states were grouped in two blocks of three (Table 1). Block : {W=22222, 
I=22211, =11211} and Block : {W=22322, I=22311, B=11311}.  The blocks have clear 
relations of dominance (11211>22211>22222 and 11311>22311>22322). Four 
sequences within each of the two blocks generated eight groups, as seen in Table 1. 
These four sequences correspond to the sequences examined in our theoretical 
discussion: B-I-W (Descending), I-B-W (Mixed_1), I-W-B (Mixed_2) and W-I-B 
(Ascending). Each subject was allocated to one group and faced three TTO questions. 
This resulted in a within and between sample design.   
 
Table 1 Survey Design and Hypotheses 
Block Groups Sequence 
Sequence of TTO 
questions 
Hypothesis: 
U health state in 
2
nd
 position vs.  
U same health 
state in 1
st
 position  
Hypothesis:  
U health state in 
3rd question vs.  
U same health state 
in 1
st
 position  
1st 2nd 3rd 
H: U(B,I,W)2 vs. 
U(B,I,W)1  





1 Descending 11211 22211 22222 H3: U(I)2 < U(I)1  H2: U(W)3 < U(W)1  
2 Mixed_1 22211 11211 22222 H1: U(B)2 > U(B)1  H2: U(W)3 < U(W)1  
3 Mixed_2 22211 22222 11211 H2: U(W)2 < U(W)1  H1: U(B)3 > U(B)1  




5 Descending 11311 22311 22322 H3: U(I)2 < U(I)1  H2: U(W)3 < U(W)1  
6 Mixed_1 22311 11311 22322 H1: U(B)2 > U(B)1  H2: U(W)3 < U(W)1  
7 Mixed_2 22311 22322 11311 H2: U(W)2 < U(W)1  H1: U(B)3 > U(B)1  
8 Ascending 22322 22311 11311 H4: U(I)2 > U(I)1  H1: U(B)3 > U(B)1  
 
A choice-based procedure was used to estimate utilities for the different health states 
(an example of a choice is shown in Supplementary Materials  1). The first choice was 
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between 20 years in bad health (e.g. one of the three health states in a group) and 2 
years in full health. This initial question was presented first as we wanted to know, as 
soon as possible, if the subject considered the health state as better or worse than dead. 
If the subject preferred 2 years in full health to 20 years in bad health, the second 
question was between 20 years in bad health and dead. In this way, after two questions 
we knew if the subject considered the health state as better or worse than dead. 
 
If the subject preferred 2 years in full health to 20 years in bad health, she had to make 
four choices in a random order chosen by the computer, namely she had to choose 
between (20 years, bad health) and (6/10/14/18 years, Full Health). Since they had to 
respond to all four questions, chances are that subjects may have produced some 
inconsistency. In that case, subjects were shown a screen with all their responses and 
asked to resolve the inconsistencies. This choice process produced an interval of 2 (0-2 
or 18-20) or 4 (2-6, 6-10, 10-14, 14-18) years where indifference should be located. This 
was further refined, via three (at most) additional choices, to an interval with a one-year 
range.  A final open question asked subjects to state the number of months, within that 
one-year interval, at which they were indifferent. 
 
If the health state was worse than dead, the indifference point was reached through a 
similar approach. It involved choices between immediate dead and the following 
profiles: (2 years, health state X; 18 years, Full Health; Dead), (6 years, health state X; 14 
years, Full Health; Dead), (10 years, health state X; 10 years, Full Health; Dead), (14 
years, health state X; 6 years, Full Health; Dead), (18 years, health state X; 2 years, Full 
Health; Dead). Again, the computer randomly presented five choices and subjects were 
invited to reconcile their inconsistencies. The preference interval was further narrowed 
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with (at most) three additional choices.   
 
3.2 Data Collection  
A market research company (Nexo S.L, Sevilla, Spain) was hired in June 2012. Initially 
the survey was delivered using face-to-face interviews but because of interviewer 
effects an online version was developed. This was piloted (n=200) before being 
delivered to the main sample.  A sample of the Spanish population between 18 and 65 
years of age (subjects over 70 years old were excluded as TTO questions included 
duration of 20 years which would exceed the average life expectancy of this age group) 
was recruited. Subjects were contacted via email and referred to the survey website. 
Incentives, in the form of points that are converted to goods, were used to encourage 
individuals to complete questionnaires. 
 
The introduction to the survey outlined the study objectives and that it formed part of a 
research project for a Spanish university, it explained that we were interested in their 
perceptions of health problems and that there were no right or wrong answers. An 
example question came next involving a choice between 20 years in health state 22111 
or 15 years in full health (11111); dead followed each choice. Each subject was 
randomised into a group and asked three TTO questions.  The survey finished with a 
series of general socio-demographic questions.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
The majority of our sequence effects predictions are presented in Table 1 (columns 7 
and 8). For example, in Group 1 health state 22211 (Intermediate) is in the second 
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position and this same health state is in position 1 in Group 2. Based on our theory, the 
utility of 22211 will be lower when evaluated in the second position than in the first 
position (U2<U1). Column 8 shows similar predictions for the health state evaluated in 
the third position relative to that evaluated first. The table shows how those predictions 
derive from our hypotheses. 
 
While Table 1 can be used to understand H1-H4, hypotheses 5 and 6 are explained here:   
 H5: U(Best)Ascending_sequence>U(Best)Mixed1. This implies that U(11211) in Group 4 
will be higher than U(11211) in Group 2. It also implies that U(11311) in Group 8 
will be higher than U(11311) in Group 6.  
 H6: U(Worst)Descending_sequence<U(Worst)Mixed2. This implies that U(22222) in Group 
1 will be lower than U(22222) in Group 3. It also implies that U(22322) in Group 
5 will be lower than U(22322) in Group 7. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis  
3.4.1 Adjusting TTO scores 
 
In TTO questions, health states ‘full health’ and ‘dead’ are assigned scores of 1 and 0, 
respectively. For health states valued better than dead, the value assigned to the health 
state (i.e. B, I or W) is x/20, where x equates to the number of years spent in full health.  
The value of health states considered worse than dead is calculated by –x/(20-x). 
Because the observed health state values ranged between 0 and -239, utilities <0 
(approximately 10% of the sample) were normalised to -1 following Shaw et al. (2005), 
i.e. transformed values were obtained by dividing them by the lowest negative potential 
utility.  Analysis is based on this normalised data.  
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3.4.2 Testing hypotheses 
  
A linear regression model is used to test our hypotheses. The eight groups that 
respondents belong to are categorised according to our four different health state 
sequences: Ascending, Mixed_1, Mixed_2 and Descending (see Table 1).   If the sequence 
does not matter, then the responses (utility values) should not depend on the type of 
group. Therefore, in a regression with the dependent variable being the utility of a 
health state (Best, Intermediate and Worst) the type of group should not systematically 
predict the utility level. The linear regression model for individual i is expressed in 
equation 2: 
  
2) Ui(Health-Statej)= β1Grouptypex + β2Grouptypey + β3Grouptypez + γiXi + εi  
i=1…N 
 
Where β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients of interest, Xi is a vector of personal 
characteristics (Gender, Age, Marital status etc.), εi is a stochastic error term, 
j=1,2,3 (Health-State1 = Best; Health-State2 = Intermediate; Health-State3 = Worst) and 
Grouptypex,y,z = Descending; Mixed_1; Mixed_2; and/or Ascending.  
 
In the above equation, utility of a health state (e.g. U(Best)) as the dependent variable is 
regressed on group types to test the six hypotheses presented in Section 3.3. Using the 
utility of a specific health state as the dependent variable implies that each model 
includes one valuation for each individual. In each regression model, a group type is left 
out to satisfy the assumption of no multicollinearity. This excluded group type serves as 
a reference category and the β coefficients are always interpreted in relation to the 
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reference category. If there are no sequence effects the β coefficients should not be 
statistically different than zero; otherwise there are sequence effects and rejection or 
not of our six hypotheses will depend on the sign of the coefficient.   
 
Robustness checks in the form of regressions on subsamples of subjects are also 
performed. First, we excluded the 20% fastest subjects to see how this impacted results 
as subjects who answered very quickly may not have taken the time to understand the 
TTO questions properly. Second, we excluded subjects who violated dominance (e.g. 
providing a higher utility to 22222 than 22211) at least once as this indicates subjects 
have been inconsistent with their responses (see Section 4.2). 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample 
6,003 members of a market research panel were initially invited, by email, to participate 
in the survey in May-June 2013. 2,016 individuals (a 33.6% response rate) consented of 
whom 251 were randomly excluded as excess to quota4; 270 individuals did not 
complete the survey leaving a sample of 1,495 subjects to be randomly allocated to 10 
groups. This study focuses on 8 of those 10 groups (n=1,197). Individual characteristics 





                                                        
4 Quotas were established according to sex and age (18-34, 35-55, 56-70). 
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Table 2 Individual Characteristics 
  








Marital Status  




Primary school level or less 8.52% 
Secondary school level 39.85% 
Graduate level 51.63% 





Monthly Income  
Below 900 Euros 31.75% 
901-1,500 Euros 30.16% 
1,501-2,000 Euros 20.05% 
2,001-3,000 Euros 11.53% 
Over 3,000 Euros 6.52% 
Survey Indicators   
Violation of dominance* 29.24% 
Mean (standard deviation) survey 
completion time in minutes 
15.59’ (6.60’) 
*Refers to respondents who violated dominance (e.g. providing a higher utility to 22222 than 22211) at 
least once. 
 
4.2 Health State Utilities  
Descriptive statistics relating to normalised health state utilities are shown in Table 3. A 
logical order, predicted by dominance, is shown for both means and medians.  Medians 





















 U1  U2  U3  U1 U2 U3 







.896 .775 .496 







.825 .904 .654 







.796 .696 .946 







.737 .896 .975 







.633 .496 .125 







.694 .794 .492 







.675 .496 .896 







.542 .725 .846 
 
4.3 Statistical tests of Sequence Effects 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis; only the coefficients of interest are 


















Table 4 Regression coefficients and associated hypotheses 
Hypothesis Dependent Covariate
a 





































-.055* (.029) .059 
H4 U(Intermediate)
e 












.144*** (.034) .000 
aAll regression models controlled for gender, age, marital status, education level, labour market status and income 
level. See Supplementary Materials 2 for the full set of results. b Huber–White robust standard errors in parentheses. 
c Reference category: Descending. d Reference category: Ascending. e Reference category: Mixed. f Reference 
category: Ascending. g Reference category: Descending. *** Denotes significance at the 99% level, ** Denotes 
significance at the 95% level, * Denotes significance at the 90% level. 
 
 
Overall, our results suggest the presence of sequence effects. H1-H2 show that the utility 
of the best (worst) health state (B) is higher (lower) when it appears in an ascending 
(descending) sequence than in a mixed sequence and these results are statistically 
significant.  For example, in H1 U(Best) in an Ascending sequence is on average higher 
(0.136) than U(Best) in a Descending sequence (the reference category) and the result is 
statistically significant. The utility of the intermediate health state is also statistically 
significantly lower (higher) when it follows the best (worst) health state than when its 
evaluated first in the sequence (H3-H4). Finally, statistically significant evidence is 
provided for H5-H6 as the utility of the best (worst) health state is higher (lower) when 
evaluated third as opposed to second in the sequence, when the previous health state in 
the sequence is the same in both cases.  Our robustness checks are consistent with these 




One interesting result that we did not predict but that helps the understanding of our 
data relates to the comparison of the sequences Descending vs. Mixed-1 and Ascending 
vs. Mixed-2 (see Table 3). In these comparisons the same health state is evaluated in 
third place (W in Descending and Mixed_1 and B in Ascending and Mixed_2) and they 
are preceded by the same health states but in reversed order. According to contrast 
effects, the role of the previous health state is larger the more similar it is to the health 
state being evaluated meaning there should be greater contrast for the health state 
evaluated third in the sequence I-B-W (Mixed_1) than in the sequence B-I-W 
(Descending). This should produce lower utilities for W in Mixed_1 than in the 
Descending sequence. However, the observed effect is the opposite; statistical analysis 
shows that U(W) is lower in the Descending sequence than in Mixed_1. Similarly, we also 
fail to observe the effect predicted by contrast for U(B) in Mixed_2 and Ascending; no 
differences in U(B) are observed. This suggests other effects, apart from contrast, are 
affecting our results. We believe it is imprecision.  Imprecision predicts that we should 
find a lower U(W) in Descending than in Mixed_1 and a higher U(B) in Ascending than in 
Mixed_2. This occurs because in the sequence I-B-W there is very little overlap between 
LB and LW meaning this effect should be small. While in the sequence B-I-W there is 
more overlap between LI and LW  which pushes U(W) lower. The same argument (in the 
opposite direction) applies to U(B). Our results suggest that in the case of bad health 
states (22222 and 22322) this second effect is stronger than contrast and that for the 
best health states (11211 and 11311) both effects may cancel each other out. 
4.4 Sequence effects in ‘simpler’ preferences 
 
Sequence effects are also observed in ‘simpler’ preferences. ‘Simpler’ preferences relate 
to two type of values. First, whether health states are considered better or worse than 
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dead for which subjects should have more defined preferences; this test helps us explore 
whether eliciting preferences using an internet survey may be causing our results. There 
are two reasons for this. One is that the choice between (Health State X, 20 years) and 
dead, was the second choice they saw, after the choice between (Health State X, 20 
years) and (Full Health, 2 years). Thus subjects should not be confused or tired by this 
stage. The second reason is that this question is very clear cut - you prefer immediate 
dead or not. The effect is very impressive especially for the worst health states in each 
block. In the case of 22222, the proportion of subjects who consider that the health state 
is worse than dead moves from 8.9% when it is evaluated in the first position to 19.0% 
in the Descending sequence. While in the case of health state 22322, the percentages are 
19.0% when evaluated in the first position compared to 29% in the Descending 
sequence. The second ‘simpler’ preference relates to what we have called “extreme 
traders” - those who gave up one month (the minimum) out of 20 years in order to 
improve quality of life. This time we focus on the best health states, since this effect 
mainly affects the better health states. We find that 18.3% are “extreme traders” if 
11211 is evaluated in the first position and this jumps to an impressive 44.6% in the 
Ascending sequence. In the case of health state 11311 the percentages are 8.2% when 
evaluated in the first position and 21.1% in the Ascending sequence. 
5. Discussion 
 
Choice-based stated preference methods, such as TTOs and SGs, are used to establish 
health state utilities that inform decisions of national Health Technology Assessment 
(HTA) agencies regarding the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. The assumption 
of procedural invariance – irrelevant changes to the order in which health states are 
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evaluated will not alter their value – underlies these methods. However, our results 
question the validity of this assumption. Evidence is provided that sequence effects, can 
affect preferences. Specifically, utilities of health states are biased downwards if 
preceded by a better health state and biased upwards if preceded by a worse health 
state. Additionally, our results suggest randomisation alone will not make these effects 
disappear; precedent-dependent order effects will still occur even if we randomize. We 
explain these results using a model that recognises that preferences in a TTO or SG 
questions are context-dependent and imprecise.  
 
It is important to clarify that we do not think that all studies where utilities for health 
states are estimated in a sequence will show the strong effects observed in this study. 
Some of the features of our design may exaggerate these effects. For example, having 
only three health states makes it easier for people to compare between health states and 
to try and be consistent. However, the purpose of our study design was not to minimize 
sequence effects but to try and understand them. The results of our study mean we 
better understand the process by which those effects can happen; that, for example, can 
help us explain the results of Augestad et al (2012) since they obtain, in a less stylized 
design, the same results that our model predicts. Having clarified this point, we move to 
the implications of this study. 
 
In addition to aiding the understanding of sequence effects our study adds to the 
evidence base of studies that have observed preference elicitation procedures that 
should (under basic rationality assumptions) be equivalent, produce very different 
results. The reaction of researchers to such results sometimes consists of suggesting 
other kinds of methods or techniques that could solve these problems. By “solve” we 
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mean methods that elicit “true” values. While we do not reject the need to develop better 
methods, the problem is that most of those models are based on a rational model where 
a subject’s response reflects true preferences. Yes, an error term, is added to the utility 
function but since it is assumed to have a zero mean a large sample size is thought to be 
enough to find out true preferences. Our model suggests that even if this error has zero 
mean, it can generate biases. This paper suggests that the intrinsic difficulty in 
responding to TTO questions may produce context-dependent and imprecise 
preferences. This generates problems for all kind of preference elicitation methods that 
assume subjects reveal context-free values for health state values except for the 
influence of a random component (see Bansback et al. (2012) as an example) and that 
when aggregated do not produce any bias. However, if the model we have used to 
explain our data describes people’s preferences better than the standard model, in the 
case of the evaluation of health states, even the best methods may not provide that 
“true” value. This is important because if preferences are imprecise, and if subjects make 
relative comparisons when they respond to preference elicitation questions, we need to 
understand those effects in order to separate out the true component of preferences 




We observe sequence effects in the valuation of health states that are in line with 
predictions arising from a model that incorporates preference imprecision. It is 
suggested these effects will not disappear with randomisation. Understanding how 
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preference imprecision and relative comparisons interact with the methods used to 
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